Delegate conceptions of representation require legislators' activity to reflect their constituents' preferences. Giger and Klüver (2016) have examined the distortionary effects of lobbying activities on this representational linkage. Here, I argue that the effect of interest groups on legislators' behavior depends on the clarity of the majority's preferences in a district. When the electorate is narrowly divided, MPs may be either genuinely uncertain where the majority's preference stands on, or choose to reap the benefits associated with interest groups as costs from defection are lowest. My reanalysis of the evidence shows that the positive (negative) of MPs' ties with sectional (cause) groups on MPs' defection are moderated by the lopsidedness of the majority's preference. This evidence modifies GK's conclusions by showing that MPs' respond to interest groups only in the specific scenario of a narrowly divided electorate on an issue and to voters when what the majority wants becomes obvious.
A crucial aspect in the chain of democratic representation is that the representatives' activity should reflect their constituents' preferences (Pitkin, 1967; Powell, 2004, among others) . Even though an idealized vision of democracy might suggest that the link between voters and representatives should be straightforward, there are strong reasons to believe that this is not always the case. In a recent paper, Giger and Klver (2016) (hereafter, GK) provide a rather pessimistic view of the linkage between voters and representatives.
The authors suggest that the connection is distorted by the lobbying activities of interest groups. They show empirically that interest groups indeed appear to exert strong influence on legislators' behavior in Parliament. In particular, MPs who have strong ties with "sectional" groups, groups that represent specific segments of a society and pursue private interests such as farmers or business organizations, are more likely to defect from the preferences of their voters. By contrast, legislators who have strong ties with "cause" groups, those that pursue a common good such as human rights or a clean environment, are more likely to vote with the preference of the majority of their constituents. This finding regarding sectional group is troubling for the notion of representational democracy in the presence of lobbying, and it becomes even more disturbing in the light of authors' descriptive data showing the frequent disagreement between voters and interest groups on most referenda in Switzerland throughout the period of study : 1996, 2006, and 2009. While these results are striking, the authors leave the implications of a specific aspect of their own research design largely unexplored: the sequence of events in their quasiexperimental design is reversed. More specifically, the assessment of MP defection is based on the roll call votes by the MPs in the Parliament on the policy prior to the referendum where the constituents preferences are revealed. If the MP does not vote the same as the majority of the electorate subsequently votes in her district, this is coded as a defection.
Ideally, the matching procedure of roll call votes and referendum outcome would follow a reversed sequence of events: the public opinion is revealed to the MP and, then, the MP, aware of what his or her voters want, cast his or her vote in line, or not, with the majority of his or her constituents. Voting against the majority's preference in this scenario would clearly indicate MPs' defection from their constituents.
In other words, the quasi-experimental approach in the Swiss case has an important shortcoming, that is, legislators cast their votes before the revelation of constituents' preferences through the referendum ever takes place. In order to interpret any disjuncture between constituents and MPs as "defection", we must assume that MPs are able to perfectly forecast the outcome of the referenda with certainty. The authors are aware of this shortcoming and argue that MPs are quite knowledgeable of the opinion of their constituents through public debates and opinion polls. However, while forecasting the majority's preference in a referendum that ends up lopsided is plausible, it is less clear that forecasting the results of a referendum which is ultimately decided by a narrow margin of victory may be a much more difficult task. Note that this is a particularly daunting task given that the outcome, the constituency referendum outcome, is measured at the level of the electoral district (the canton), where the informational environment is probably rather sparse. Thus, while we can safely assume that an MP is truly defecting from her constituents if she votes against her constituents when the referendum is ultimately lopsided, all that an MP may know about a referendum that is ultimately decided by a narrow margin of victory is that her voters are divided on that issue.
In this paper, I re-analyze GK's (2016b) data, by taking into account the certainty with which a legislator is likely to know or not know about the ultimate outcome of a referendum at the point she needs to make a decision in Parliament.
1 . Accounting for this leads to fundamentally different empirical expectations. In GK's (2016b) theoretical framework, MPs associated with sectional (cause) interest groups are always more (less)
likely to defect from their voters. In other words, according to GK, the ties with interest groups influence defection irrespective of the clarity of the electorate's preference, which yields the constant effect hypothesis that is as complete in their investigation:
Hypothesis 1 (constant effect): MPs ties with sectional (cause) interest groups is positively (negatively) associated with defection irrespective of the ultimate referendum outcome.
I bring the clarity or "lopsidedness" of a canton's preferences into the analysis. In particular, the distinction between close referenda and those decided by a sizable majority sheds light on the fundamental role of voters in determining when the role of interest groups is influential in the MP's decisions. The intuition behind this is that only lopsided referenda are those where MPs can be sure that their voters unequivocally support one side of the policy issue. Consequently, a deviation by the MP from the majority's preference implies a clear defection likely to provoke a backlash from a substantial number of voters.
When the referendum is ultimately decided by a narrow margin, two theories provide plausible mechanisms for how the clarity of the majority's preference influences the relationship between lobbying and representation. An MP may be genuinely uncertain where the majority of his or her constituents stand on an issue in a close referenda, especially since his or her roll call vote typically precedes the referendum by several weeks or months. This should decrease the chances for the MP to vote consistently with the majority's preference even if he or she tries to do so. By contrast, an MP desiring to be congruent with the majority's preference will have a higher rate of success in doing so as referenda becomes more lopsided -or the clarity of the signal from the constituents on what position they want the MP to take on the issue is made more obvious.
There is a second causal story for why we might expect increased MP defections when the referenda are ultimately decided by a narrow margin. If we assume that MPs' defection are electorally penalized by his or her constituents in proportion to the number of voters that disagree with the position of their MP, it logically follows that the costs that MPs incur due to defection are greater when defection occurs in lopsided referenda -deviation from the preferences of a large number of constituents -compared to a narrowly decided referenda -deviation from the preference of about half of the constituents. In short, the cost of an MP's defection is indeed the lowest when the electorate is most closely divided on the issue. Hence, when the certainty and size of any electoral punishment for the MPs are lowest, it makes sense for the MP to please the demands of interest groups in order to get the associated benefits.
Each theory represents a different mechanism. However, I cannot sort them out because both are observationally equivalent. Yet, either one of them is a very different story than what the original authors contended. Based on either of one of the mechanism just outlined, my expectations are stated in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (decreasing effect): the association of MPs ties with interest groups with defection becomes stronger as the clarity of the majority's preference in a referendum decreases (the ultimate referendum outcome is narrower). 67%/33%, and about half that were more lopsided than this -the median value is -16.8.
2
To test whether closeness of the referendum moderates the effect of interest groups on defection, I repeat the original models from GK (2016), but then also interact their main effects with closeness of the referendum.
3 Table 1 presents The first element to consider from the results is that the added interaction in the models significantly improves their goodness of fit (LR test = χ 2 (2) = 102.8 * * * ). This can be seen in the results of the likelihood ratio test, which shows that the addition of the interactive terms significantly improves the fit of the models over GK's null model treating the effects of interest groups on defection as constant across all referenda margins of victory.
From the regression results in table 1, there is sufficient evidence to reject GK's hypothesis 1, the constant-effect hypothesis, which conjectured a constant effect of ties with interest groups on defection along the closeness of the referenda. Sectional group ties increase the probability that MPs defect from their voters but only when the electorate is narrowly divided. The main effect of the number of sectional group from model 2 indicates that when the margin of victory is 0, in the extreme case when the referendum outcome is ultimately 50/50, then the effect of lobbying on the MP voting against their constituents is statistically significant at a 99% confidence level in the expected direction. In addition, we also see that the interaction term takes a positive value. This indicates that as referenda become more lopsided, the effect of lobbying dissipates. figure 2 shows that 4 As a reminder, the margin of victory is coded to take only negative values, with theoretical extreme values ranging from -50 (100/0 outcome) to 0 (50/50 outcome). Thus, as referenda become ore lopsided, the variable margin of victory decreases. Consequently, a positive interaction term means that increases in lopsidedness are associated with a decrease in the effect of lobbying.
5 Since the conclusions remain substantively unaltered if the measure of the number of ties with sectional groups refers to MPs' party rather than the MP herself, I show and discuss the results based on the party-level ties in the appendix section.
the most striking finding from GK's original research piece, the positive association between MP's ties with sectional groups and MP's defection, is statistically significant in the expected direction only for referenda with a margin of victory of 63.1% or lower at the MP-level.
Referenda with margins of victory this narrow constitute only 37.9% of the observations. In addition, even for the referenda for which the association is positive, the effect of lobbying on defection consistently decreases with the lopsidedness of the referenda. Not only does the main finding rapidly become substantively insignificant or lose its statistical reliability once the district's preferences become clear (or the referendum becomes mildly lopsided), but even the sign of the effect flips into a negative effect for a wide range of margins of victory.
As briefly noted above, for an evaluation of the implications of the interactive model, we should also look at the number of observations that are expected to be within the range of margins of victory. If the shift of sign of the marginal effects only occurs at extreme values of closeness in the sample or it only involves a small number of observations, then the conditional effect would be of less concern. However, the histogram underneath the fitted line of the marginal effect shows the distribution of referenda at each value of margin of victory.
From this, we can see that the threshold of statistical non-significance of -13.1 and the threshold of flipping sign are in the middle of the distribution, roughly dividing the sample in two halves. Consequently, the interaction model shows that the reported positive effect of MPs ties with interest groups on defecting from their constituents, originally reported by GK, is only limited to a particular set of referenda that, altogether, constitute less than half of the observations. Likewise, MPs ties with cause group strengthen the link between MPs and voters, but the strengthening effect declines as the referendum becomes more lopsided. Model 2 shows that the coefficient of the main effect of the number of cause groups on defection is negative.
This indicates that as the number of cause groups associated with an MP or an MP's party increases, MPs are less likely to defect from the electorate when the margin of victory is In sum, there is evidence to reject GK's hypothesis 1, which states that effect of lobbying by cause groups on MPs' defection is constant along the values of the margins of victory of the referenda. Instead, there is evidence that cause groups' lobbying strengthen the MP-citizen link, lowering the chances of defection, only when the electorate is narrowly divided, yet their effect substantively weakens when the signal of the majority's preference of the electorate becomes more obvious.
Do MPs Respond to Voters or Interest Groups?
Whether and when MPs defect from their constituents to support the preferred positions of certain types of interest groups is more nuanced than previously portrayed. The re-analysis offered in this paper shows that MPs respond to both voters and interest groups, but the people's voice dominates interest groups' demands when the electorate in a district is clearly on one side of the policy issue. By contrast, interest groups are more likely to shape policy decisions when the electorate is narrowly divided and/or the MP is not certain about 
